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 FEMINIST (OR “FEMINIST”) REFORM OF 
SELF-DEFENSE LAW: SOME CRITICAL 
REFLECTIONS 
JOSHUA DRESSLER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Today I want to talk about proposals to ―reform‖ (notice the quotes) the 
law of self-defense.  The proposals I will discuss are intended to expand the 
scope of the criminal law defense—that is, to justify greater use of force, 
specifically deadly force, in self-protection than currently is authorized.  I will 
be criticizing these proposals, some more harshly than others.  And, as it turns 
out, these reform proposals are, to differing degrees, advocated by persons 
who espouse feminism or, at least, characterize themselves as feminists and 
who support their reform proposals with feminist rhetoric. 
In critiquing these so-called feminist reform proposals, I do so with 
trepidation.  First, I am sensitive to the fact that attaching labels, such as 
―feminism,‖ to ideas or proposals often interferes with serious discussion.  I 
don‘t want that to happen.  Also, of course, there are ideological schisms 
within feminism, as there are with all intellectual theories.  I do not intend to 
discuss those distinctions.
1
  I am quite prepared to accept that, while some 
 
* Frank R. Strong Chair in Law, The Ohio State University, Michael E. Moritz College of Law.  
This Essay is a revised version of the George and Margaret Barrock Lecture on Criminal Law, which 
I gave at Marquette University Law School on April 8, 2010.  As this Essay is, at its core, a lecture, I 
have tried to retain its informality and relative brevity.  Unfortunately, my Type A personality and 
three-decades-plus habit of footnote writing compelled me to add more footnotes to the text than a 
lecture requires.  For those who find footnotes irritating, you can safely ignore them.  For those who 
want everything footnoted that can be, my apologies (and condolences).  I thank Professor Michael 
O‘Hear, Dean Joseph Kearney, and all the other fine people at the Law School who made my time at 
Marquette so enjoyable.  I also thank participants at a faculty workshop at the University of Oregon 
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1. As some evidence that the term ―feminism‖ has become almost mainstream, we find that 
Sarah Palin told Katie Couric that she (Palin) is a feminist.  Couric asked Palin, ―Do you consider 
yourself a feminist?‖ Palin responded,  
I do.  I‘m a feminist who believes in equal rights and I believe that women 
certainly today have every opportunity that a man has to succeed and to try to 
do it all anyway.  And I‘m very, very thankful that I‘ve been brought up in a 
family where gender hasn‘t been an issue.  You know, I‘ve been expected to do 
everything growing up that the boys were doing.  We were out chopping wood 
and you‘re out hunting and fishing and filling our freezer with good wild 
Alaskan game to feed our family.  So it kinda started with that.  With just that 
expectation that the boys and the girls in my community were expected to do 
 persons who call themselves feminists may agree with all of the reform 
proposals I will discuss today, other feminists do not favor one or another of 
the proposals.  Indeed, I have doubts about characterizing one particular 
proposal as feminist, but I do so—at least, in quotes—because its chief 
advocate calls herself a feminist and has proposed changes in self-defense law 
on the ground of empowering women.  So if you object to the label 
―feminism‖ attached to one or more of these proposals, I can‘t fault you.  I 
could strip the word ―feminism‖ from title of today‘s lecture, but this change 
would not lessen the importance of the subject: any effort to expand the legal 
use of deadly force is surely a matter about which we should have 
considerable concern. 
I have decided to focus on the feminist aspects of this area because I 
consider myself a feminist, and I respect and value feminism, so it is a matter 
of concern to me when people with whom I am generally allied go in a 
direction I regret.  As other scholars, such as Jeannie Suk and Aya Gruber 
have noted, ―the feminist war on crime‖2 has brought us to ―strange 
crossroads,‖3 in which feminists and law-and-order advocates, such as the 
National Rifle Association and the Victims‘ Rights movement, seem at times 
to be—if you will pardon the expression—in bed together. 
For today‘s lecture, when I do use the term ―feminism‖ or ―feminist,‖ I do 
so in the very general sense explained by Martha Chamallas in her book 
Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory: 
Most legal writers or practitioners who identify 
themselves as feminists are critical of the status quo.  The 
root of the criticism is the belief that women are currently in a 
subordinate position in society and that the law often reflects 
and reinforces this subordination.  Whatever their differences, 
feminists tend to start with the assumption that the law‘s 
treatment of women has not been fair or equal and that 
 
the same and accomplish the same.  That‘s just been instilled in me. 
When Couric asked for Palin‘s definition of a feminist, Palin said, ―Someone who believes in equal 
rights.  Someone who would not stand for oppression against women.‖   Transcript: Palin and 
McCain Interview (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/09/30/eveningnews/ 
main4490788.shtml?source=m. 
Talk show host Laura Ingraham stated that ―Sarah Palin represents a new feminism. . . . And 
there is no bigger threat to the elites in this country than a woman who lives her conservative 
convictions.‖  Robin Abcarian, Insiders See “New Feminism,” L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2008, at A13; 
see also Posting of Peter Hamby to Palin Changes Tune on ―Feminist‖ Label, CNN.com, 
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2008/10/23/palin-changes-tune-on-feminist-label (Oct. 23, 2008 
20:32 CST) (noting Palin‘s remark that ―I‘m not going to label myself feminist or not‖). 
2. Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741 (2007). 
3. Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 237, 275 (2008). 
 change is desirable. . . .  Feminist legal scholarship is . . . 
oppositional; it assumes there is a problem and is suspicious 
of current arrangements . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Feminist critiques [of the law] can take many forms; they 
can consist of thick narrative descriptions, causal analyses, or 
advocacy of reform.
4
 
My comments, of course, will focus on feminist advocacy of reform of the 
criminal law. 
One last introductory comment: As I consider myself a feminist, I find the 
premise that the ―criminal law is, from top to bottom, preoccupied with male 
concerns and male perspectives‖5 an uncontroversial observation.  How could 
it be otherwise, when the criminal law—at least the most important crimes 
and doctrines—was developed at a time when men, exclusively, served as 
judges and, later, legislators.  Even the most fair-minded person can only see 
the world through his or her own eyes, based on his or her own life 
experiences, so the criminal law necessarily has a gender-based imbalance 
that justifies our serious attention.  Thus, feminism has enhanced the law by 
forcing us to rethink all of our presuppositions to determine if we can defend 
the status quo.  And, in some areas of criminal law, feminist reform efforts 
have, to my mind, improved the law, most notably rape law.
6
  But a lecture 
about what is right and good is not especially interesting, so I want to spend 
my time here focusing on an area that concerns me. 
II.  GENERAL FEMINIST CRITICISMS OF SELF-DEFENSE LAW 
A.  Pre-Reform Law 
Recent modifications in self-defense law, as well as currently proposed 
changes, are the focus of this Barrock Lecture.  I need to start, however, with 
a brief review of traditional (―old fashioned,‖ if you will) self-defense law.  
First, in recent centuries self-defense has been characterized as a justification 
defense.  That is, when a person claims self-defense, she is stating that killing 
the aggressor was the right thing to do—that the result of a dead human being 
is a good result or, at least, a non-wrongful result.  Thus, in thinking about the 
 
4. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 1–2 (2d ed. 2003). 
5. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 
2151 (1995); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
161–62 (1989) (―The state is male in the feminist sense: the law sees and treats women the way men 
see and treat women.‖).  
6. Even here, I once had concerns with some feminist-supported changes in the law.  See 
Joshua Dressler, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some Cautionary 
Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409 (1998).   
 reform proposals we should not lose sight of the fact that by expanding the 
right to use deadly force, our society is asserting that greater use of deadly 
force by persons threatened with harm is desirable or, at least, okay with us. 
When is deadly force justifiable?  In general, traditional self-defense law 
provides that such force may be used only by an innocent person against an 
aggressor if the non-aggressor reasonably believes (even if she is wrong) that 
deadly force is necessary to repel an imminent unlawful deadly attack.
7
  
Under this doctrine, if the innocent person can reasonably avoid death using 
no force at all, she must use the nonviolent route rather than kill.  Similarly, if 
she can reasonably avoid death by using nondeadly force, then she must use 
this lesser degree of force.  And she must use deadly force only if the 
unlawful deadly attack reasonably appears to be imminent; that is, it will 
occur almost immediately.  One message, therefore, of traditional self-defense 
law is that it generally values human life.
8
  Even the bad guy, the aggressor, 
should not be killed unless there reasonably appears to be no realistic option.  
Another reason (one to which I will return later) for the narrow rules of self-
defense is the belief that use of deadly force should, whenever possible, be 
reserved to the state because, as Hale put it in the seventeenth century, 
―private persons are not trusted to take capital revenge one of another.‖9 
I don‘t want to overstate the narrowness of traditional self-defense law.  
There have always been exceptions to the law I just described.  Most notably, 
it has always been the case that a person, attacked in his castle—that is, in his 
home—need not flee his dwelling, even if such retreat would make deadly 
defensive force unnecessary.  And, over time, the law of self-defense, which 
we adopted from England, was reshaped in some jurisdictions, originally 
primarily in western states, to permit innocent persons to stand their ground, 
rather than retreat, outside the home, and use deadly force if it is otherwise 
necessary.  But, in general, self-defense law has favored, to the extent 
possible, protecting all human life, including the aggressor‘s. 
 
7. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 18.01[B] (5th ed. 2009). 
8. See Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 64 CAL. 
L. REV. 871, 878–81 (1976).  Kadish states that ―[i]t is clear . . . that we value life very highly.‖  Id. 
at 878.  He discusses various perspectives: from the ―good and simple moral principle that human life 
is sacred,‖ id. (citing GENERAL SYNOD BOARD FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, CHURCH OF ENGLAND, 
ON DYING WELL: AN ANGLICAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATE ON EUTHANASIA 24 (1975)), 
which suggests that no killing is ever justifiable; to a weaker (and legally more accurate) statement 
that ―one may never intentionally‖ (purposely, as distinguishable from knowingly) ―choose to take 
the life of another, for whatever end,‖ id. at 879; to a somewhat weaker proposition still, namely, 
there exists ―a presumption in favor of life and against killing, so that there can be exceptional 
circumstances in which the value of life is outweighed by other values or in which killing may be 
justified on other grounds,‖ id. at 880.  And, Kadish argues, the law supports a ―principle of equality; 
namely, that all human lives must be regarded as having an equal claim to preservation simply 
because life itself is an irreducible value.‖  Id.   
9. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *481. 
 B.  Feminist Critique 
So, what is wrong with this picture?  Feminists point out that self-defense 
law developed primarily in the context of male-on-male violence.  The law 
developed in two general circumstances: first, when an aggressor, typically a 
male, threatened an innocent person, typically another male; and, second, 
when two men, unrelated to each another, got into an altercation (perhaps 
today we would envision two strangers in a bar) that escalated into violence.  
As Cynthia Gillespie described the latter scenario, but which could just as 
easily apply to the former, ―[t]he law of self-defense . . . [took] on the 
character of a code of acceptable manly behavior for a person who was facing 
a dangerous adversary . . . .  It was all very masculine, two-fisted stuff . . . .‖10 
Feminists also remind us that self-defense law developed during a time 
when a man was supposed to be his wife‘s and children‘s protector.  Thus, 
self-defense law did not develop with a mind to the case in which a woman—
at that time, almost always in the home or in her husband‘s company—might 
need to use force against a male aggressor; and certainly the law did not have 
in mind the scenario of a wife using force against her husband.
11
  As a 
consequence, males judges developing self-defense law did not seriously 
consider the problems that arise from the inherently unequal strength of the 
parties if a woman has to defend herself against a male aggressor; and the law 
did not consider the fact that females typically have less experience in 
defensive use of force than men; and, perhaps most significantly, the law did 
not consider that, in cases of domestic violence, the female is unlikely to be 
free of her aggressor-partner‘s violence.  Even if she can avoid injury today, 
she is effectively incarcerated in the home with a violent partner, creating an 
ongoing danger to her—a very different scenario than the single-incident 
aggression in a bar or on the street.  As a result of these differences, some 
feminists have argued that self-defense law is guilty of applying—to use a 
term coined by Susan Estrich in the context of rape law
12—‖boys‘ rules,‖ that 
is, rules that might make sense in the context of men fighting other men, but 
which have no place in the context of male-on-female aggression or, 
 
10. CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND 
THE LAW 41 (1989). 
11. Indeed, for support of this feminist critique one need only look to Blackstone‘s 
Commentaries, which observed that ―[i]f the baron kills his feme it is the same as if he had killed a 
stranger, or any other person,‖ but, lo and behold, ―if the feme kills her baron, it is regarded by the 
laws as a much more atrocious crime, as she not only breaks through the restraints of humanity and 
conjugal affection, but throws off all subjection to the authority of her husband.‖ 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *445 n.103 (William Draper Lewis ed., 
Philadelphia, Rees Welsh & Co. 1897) (1765).  According to the Commentaries, the killing of one‘s 
husband was a ―species of treason,‖ for which the wife was to be drawn and burnt alive.  Id. 
12. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091 (1986). 
 therefore, the case of female-on-male self-protection. 
Consequently, feminists have sought self-defense reforms.  Before turning 
to their proposals, however, let‘s put things in perspective.  The ―boys‘ rules‖ 
label attached to self-defense law is an overstatement, as Professor Estrich has 
observed.
13
  Remember the message I suggested is at the core of common law 
self-defense law: Human life is deeply valued, even that of the aggressor.  As 
Estrich has written, self-defense rules do not exist to ―torment‖ women: 
―Unlike, say, the resistance requirement in rape law, [self-defense rules] are 
not born from a historic distrust of women, or a desire to keep them 
powerless.  They exist, quite simply, to preserve human life where deadly 
force is not reasonably necessary.‖14 According to Estrich, ―these rules were 
[not] designed to define ‗manly behavior.‘ . . . In many cases, the rules exist 
not so much to define manly behavior as to limit manly instincts—in order to 
preserve human life.‖15 
For example, when I am threatened by an aggressor, one non-violent 
solution might be for me to run—or, as the law puts it, to retreat to a place of 
known safety.  Though, as I have noted, the retreat requirement has never 
been absolute, there was a retreat requirement outside the home in most 
American states during much of our nation‘s history.  That is not a boys‘ rule.  
Real Men, Clint Eastwood Men, Macho Men, do not run from their attackers.  
That‘s ―cowardly.‖  The retreat rule is, as one scholar put it, an ―affront to . . . 
values of masculinity and bravery.‖16  Real Men stand their ground and tell 
aggressors, ―Make my day!‖17  But, as Blackstone observed, ―though it may 
be cowardice, in time of war between two independent nations, to flee from 
an enemy; yet between two fellow subjects the law countenances no such 
point of honor.‖18  So, to the extent that traditional retreat requirements 
remain in force, the law resolutely rejects ―boys‘ rules,‖ or if you will, ―Real 
Men‘s rules.‖  Furthermore, retreat issues aside, the requirement that one not 
use deadly force if lesser force will do—that is, that innocent persons not use 
disproportional force against attackers—shows a gentility inconsistent with 
machismo.  Indeed, even the imminent-threat requirement serves to punish 
one manly ―instinct,‖ namely, a male‘s desire for ―vigilante revenge for 
 
13. Susan Estrich, Defending Women, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1430, 1431 (1990) (reviewing 
GILLESPIE, supra note 10). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Elaine M. Chiu, Culture in Our Midst, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 231, 245 (2006). 
17. See Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199–200 (1876) (―[A] true man, who is without fault, 
is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life 
. . . .‖).  
18. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *185. 
 attacks on one‘s family that occurred hours or days before.‖19 
Thus, the feminist-based stigma attached to self-defense law is not 
altogether fair.  Let‘s not be too quick, then, to think self-defense law requires 
feminist reform from top to bottom.  But perhaps some reform is in order, so 
let‘s look further. 
III.  ―MAKE MY DAY‖: WOMEN ACTING JUST LIKE MEN 
Professor Elaine Chiu has observed that legal doctrine usually outlasts the 
culture in which the law developed.
20
  However, the retreat doctrine, 
specifically the requirement that a person retreat if she can do so at no 
reasonable risk to herself rather than stand her ground, is eroding at a 
particularly fast pace.  The change may be, in part, a function of the violent 
nature of modern American life, but it is more likely the result of the ability of 
groups like the National Rifle Association to play on our fears of violence.  
But it is also the result of feminist ―empowerment‖ efforts or, at a minimum, 
the astute (one might even call wily) efforts of conservative law-and-order 
advocates to use feminist arguments in support of their self-defense reform 
proposals, and thus co-opt some feminists. 
The erosion of the retreat requirement, in part by invoking feminist 
rhetoric, is ironic.  As I just noted, the retreat rule is perhaps the least ―male‖ 
self-defense doctrine.  Consider how Harvard Professor Joseph Beale 
explained the doctrine more than a century ago: 
A really honorable man, a man of truly refined and elevated 
feeling, would perhaps always regret the apparent cowardice 
of retreat, but he would regret ten times more, after the 
excitement of the contest was past, the thought that he had the 
blood of a fellow-being on his hands.  It is undoubtedly 
distasteful to retreat; but it is ten times more distasteful to 
kill.
21
 
Since 2005, however, this seemingly pro-cowardice, anti-macho, doctrine 
of self-defense law has been successfully attacked.  With the passage of 
Florida‘s ―Make My Day‖ law,22 twenty-six other states have significantly 
expanded the scope of their self-defense rules.
23
 
 
19. Estrich, supra note 13, at 1431–32. 
20. Chiu, supra note 16, at 231–32. 
21. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567, 581 (1903). 
22. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (West Supp. 2010).  The term ―make my day law‖ was coined 
in 1985 when Colorado expanded its self-defense law to provide more protection for homeowners 
when they use deadly force against intruders.  WILLIAM WILBANKS, THE MAKE MY DAY LAW: 
COLORADO‘S EXPERIMENT IN HOME PROTECTION 1 (1990). 
23. I base this figure on Suk, supra note 3, at 263–64 nn.159–62.  Professor Suk also cited ―live 
bills‖ in 2008 that would have similarly expanded self-defense law, id. at 264 n.164, but only one of 
 Florida‘s law, a model for the other states, provides a person with the 
statutory right to stand one‘s ground and use deadly force outside the home—
to meet force with force—in any public place where the person has a right to 
be (as well as in one‘s automobile), as long as the individual ―reasonably 
believes [deadly force] is necessary . . . to prevent death or great bodily harm 
to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible 
felony.‖24  As well, the new law provides the self-defender immunity from 
criminal and civil actions that arise out of use of deadly force in the preceding 
circumstances.
25
 
Thus, the castle doctrine has come to the public streets, bars, and other 
public areas.  And the leading proponent of this change in Florida (and, 
indirectly, in the many states that have followed the Florida model) was 
Marion Hammer.  Who is Hammer?  She described herself in 2006 as a 4-
foot-11, 67-year-old woman who ―wouldn‘t hesitate to shoot you‖ if she felt 
her life was in danger or she feared injury.
26
  Perhaps more pertinently, 
however, she is a past president of the National Rifle Association—the law 
was an NRA measure.  One should not lose sight of the fact, however, that her 
rhetoric in support of greater use of deadly force in self-defense usually 
centered on the need to empower women—that is, her strategy was ―to 
feminize the NRA‘s message through the linking of gun ownership with 
protection [of women] against male violence.‖27  Indeed, Hammer observed 
that women need protection in our modern era because they are now ―working 
outside their homes, . . . [and] [t]hey [become] vulnerable to crime and 
criminals . . . .‖28  For example, she defended the Florida law this way: 
A woman is walking down the street and is attacked by a 
rapist who tries to drag her into an alley.  Under prior Florida 
law, the woman had a legal ―duty to retreat.‖  The victim of 
the attack was required to run away.  Not anymore.  Today, 
that woman has no obligation to retreat.  If she chooses, she 
may stand her ground and fight.
29
 
Now, of course, the previous law did not require the woman in her 
 
those states, Ohio, has since enacted expansive self-defense legislation, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2901.05(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).  
24. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(3) (West Supp. 2010). 
25. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West Supp. 2010). 
26. P. Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle Association-
Inspired Statutes: From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand Your Ground, 35 S.U. L. REV. 
1, 16 (2007) (quoting Hammer). 
27. Suk, supra note 3, at 267 (quoting Hammer). 
28. Nancy Norell, Women are Champions of Concealed Carry Reform, WOMEN & GUNS, 
May/June 1999, at 12, 14, available at http://www.saf.org/pub/rkba/women-guns/wg990506nn.html 
(quoting Hammer). 
29. Suk, supra note 3, at 266 (quoting Hammer). 
 scenario to run away if doing so would have jeopardized her safety.  But, the 
message is clearly one of empowerment of women. 
On closer analysis, the feminist argument here is not as feminist as it first 
appears.  Basically, Hammer‘s message is that women in modern times are 
vulnerable outside the home—outside, that is, the protection their husbands 
are expected to provide them in the castle—and, therefore, women need to be 
armed.  But once we arm these vulnerable women, we are essentially being 
told that women should not have to retreat because they can be as a macho as 
men and stand their ground.  Thus, the NRA project simultaneously 
―embraces feminine‖—we are the weaker sex and need a gun as equalizer30—
‖and feminist rhetoric.‖31 
These new no-retreat laws have affected changes inside the home as well.  
When a person uses defensive force against someone unlawfully and forcibly 
attempting to enter a dwelling (or occupied vehicle) or against one who has 
already entered the residence, the new law creates a presumption that the 
defender ―held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily 
harm to himself or herself or another.‖32  Although this is a rebuttable 
presumption, prosecutors have typically treated the presumption as virtually 
conclusive.  One can shoot the intruder almost at will. 
The latter in-home rule is not particularly feminist or even pseudo-
feminist in character.  However, Florida law (followed by some other states) 
does provide explicit benefits to domestic violence victims, presumably 
usually women, in the home.  Under the new law, if a victim of domestic 
violence receives a protective order against another person—including a 
spouse or live-in partner—and if that person seeks to enter her or their home 
in violation of the protective order—even if he is entering, for example, to 
pick up his belongings—the legal presumption I just described applies to the 
woman living there.  If she kills in these circumstances, the legal presumption 
is that she killed lawfully.
33
  Effectively, these changes give the domestic 
violence victim a justification to purchase a weapon, maybe learn how to 
handle it properly, and then use it on anyone who enters the home.  On this 
matter, the NRA and women‘s groups worked closely in alliance. 
Consider, as well, North Carolina‘s new Domestic Violence Victims 
Empowerment Act, which provides that when a domestic violence victim 
receives a ―protective order restraining the defendant from further acts of 
 
30. Norell, supra note 28, at 14 (quoting Sue King, a former NRA board member, as saying, 
―Being the weaker sex and the preferred prey of predators, we are the highest profile target.‖). 
31. Suk, supra note 3, at 267. 
32. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(1) (West Supp. 2010). 
33. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013(2)(a) (providing that the defense applies if ―there is . . . an 
injunction for protection from domestic violence‖). 
 domestic violence,‖ the clerk of the superior court that issues the order is 
required to provide the victim an informational sheet that includes a notice of 
the woman‘s right to apply for a concealed weapon permit, and to receive a 
temporary ninety-day permit while her application is being considered.
34
 
Some feminists have criticized these latter changes on the ground that they 
are likely to result in more, not less, harm to women.  But the position of 
some advocates of arming domestic violence victims is that: 
The right to protect oneself with a firearm is . . . an issue of 
choice, and an issue that is clearly a woman‘s issue.  Why do 
the politically correct ―official‖ feminists recoil from women 
defending themselves and their families with firearms?  Is it 
because, in spite of all the[ir] rhetoric about ―empowerment‖ 
and not being victims, there is still a thrill in being, after all is 
said and done, just a trembling damsel?
35
 
So we learn that some feminists are Real Women, just like their Real Men 
comrades-in-arms.  Still, I am gratified that, as other feminists demonstrate, 
one can surely be a feminist and not believe that arming women with 
concealed weapons, inviting them to kill their abusers in the home, and 
abandoning the retreat rules outside the home, are signs of cultural progress.  
Indeed, I would rather consider the abandonment of the retreat rule as, 
primarily, an NRA victory, perhaps disguised in feminist rhetoric, and not one 
truly supported by most feminists.  Let me move on, however, to reform 
proposals that lack NRA DNA, and which are more evidently identifiable as 
feminist proposals. 
IV.  BATTERED WOMEN AND NON-CONFRONTATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE 
Some feminists have sought to make it possible for battered women to 
claim self-defense when the abuse victim kills her abuser in non-
confrontational circumstances, that is, when the abuser is not attacking the 
woman but is asleep, watching television, or in some other passive, non-
threatening condition.  Consider, for example, the horrendous abuse of Judy 
Norman at the hands of her husband J.T.,
36
 a man whom I have described in 
prior scholarship as a ―moral monster.‖37  Basically, this is her story: For 
years, J.T. forced Judy to prostitute herself while he remained at home, often 
drunk.  He beat her regularly if she didn‘t bring home enough money or, 
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 really, for any reason or no reason at all.  Over the years, he beat her with his 
fists, a broken beer bottle, a bat, and other objects.  Finally, on the day in 
question, after failed efforts to obtain police protection, Judy obtained a gun 
and killed J.T. while he slept. 
Judy Norman sought to defend her actions on self-defense grounds.  The 
imminence requirement prevented her claim from succeeding.  Indeed, since 
no reasonable person could consider J.T. Norman, as he slept, an imminent 
threat to Judy‘s life, the traditional rule is that no jury instruction on self-
defense should be given in such circumstances; and that was the result in the 
Norman case.
38
  In response, some feminist reformers have sought to avoid 
the ―imminency‖ obstacle in non-confrontational cases by sleight-of-hand: 
They have argued that juries should be permitted to hear evidence of battered 
woman syndrome (BWS) and, if this is done, they claim there is a basis for a 
self-defense jury instruction. 
What is battered woman syndrome?  Dr. Lenore Walker, the originator of 
the concept,
39
 has described a cycle of violence typical in the battering 
relationship: The cycle includes periods of calm, followed by minor violence, 
leading to an acute act of violence, which is followed by contrition, often 
sincere, by the abuser, after which the process recycles.  Part of the syndrome, 
Dr. Walker asserts, is that the battering victim begins to suffer from 
psychological paralysis, and thus is unable to leave her abuser.  Despite 
criticisms of some empiricists,
40
 and in recent years of some scholars 
sympathetic to feminism,
41
 the syndrome has gained broad acceptance in the 
courts.  Indeed, advocates for battered woman have successfully convinced 
some state legislatures to codify the admissibility of BWS testimony in 
specified circumstances,
42
 rather than leave the matter to the discretion of trial 
judges on a case-by-case basis. 
How does BWS testimony supposedly solve the self-defense problem 
confronting a Judy Norman-like battered woman who kills in non-
 
38. Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 12. 
39. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984). 
40. E.g., Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the 
Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 53–59; David L. Faigman, 
Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. 
REV. 619, 630–43 (1986); David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in 
the Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 75 (1997) (noting that ―[s]urprisingly, no proponent of the 
[BWS] has responded‖ to Faigman‘s 1986 critique). 
41. E.g., Katharine K. Baker, Gender and Emotion in Criminal Law, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
447, 459 (2005) (criticizing  BWS as one-dimensional, stating that it ―paints a simplistic emotional 
picture, one of a woman who is helpless, not one who is struggling‖). 
42. Lauren K. Fernandez, Battered Woman Syndrome, Criminal Law Chapter of the Eight 
Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 235, 239 & n.26 (citing statutes 
in eight states). 
 confrontational circumstances?  First, BWS evidence arguably helps jurors 
understand why the battered woman did not leave her batterer—namely, 
emotional paralysis.  Of course, the law doesn‘t require a woman to leave her 
husband at the risk of losing her right of self-defense, but I am sympathetic to 
the concern that jurors may think that way (―If she really was abused, if things 
were really as awful as she claims, she would have left him.‖), and BWS 
evidence may reduce that risk by enhancing her credibility after she provides 
testimony of prior abuse.  To that extent, BWS has a proper place in some 
self-defense homicide trials.  But, conceptually, there is more going on here.  
The argument of reformers is that BWS evidence should be permitted in order 
to justify the claim that the battered woman subjectively believed her sleeping 
abuser
43
 represented an imminent threat and that a reasonable person would 
have so believed. 
Assuming appropriate expert testimony, syndrome evidence should also be 
admissible to support a battered woman‘s subjective belief that her abuser is an 
imminent threat to her life while asleep.
44
  There is no basis, however, for 
claiming that such a belief is a reasonable one unless the reasonable person is 
understood to be a reasonable battered woman suffering from BWS, and then 
only if we assume that ―reasonable‖ people fail to understand reality.  Isn‘t it a 
contradiction in terms, however, to describe the ―reasonable person‖ as one 
who believes that an unarmed sleeping man represents an instantaneous threat?  
Remember, the issue here is not whether the imminency requirement is good 
public policy.  Perhaps it isn‘t, an issue to which I will turn momentarily.  But, 
given the requirement, I submit it can‘t seriously be argued that a reasonable 
person would believe J.T. represented an imminent threat. 
Ironically, the practical effect of BWS evidence is to pathologize the 
battered woman.  Indeed, a juror simulation study has reported that ―the 
presence of expert evidence providing a diagnosis of [BWS], compared to a 
no expert control, [causes] the jurors to view the defendant as more distorted 
in her thinking, and less capable of making responsible choices, and less 
culpable for her actions.‖45  As Anne Coughlin has wisely observed, BWS 
―defines the woman as a collection of mental symptoms, motivational deficits, 
and behavioral abnormalities; indeed, the fundamental premise of the defense 
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 is that women lack the psychological capacity to choose lawful means to 
extricate themselves from abusive mates.‖46  Professor Coughlin characterizes 
use of BWS evidence in this context as a ―misogynist defense.‖47  Indeed, use 
of BWS testimony potentially brings courts back, full circle, to the early 
battered women cases, in which women sought to defend themselves on 
grounds of temporary insanity or diminished capacity.
48
  The only difference 
is that the mental health testimony is now disguised in self-defense clothing. 
Of course, one can put aside battered woman syndrome and argue that a 
battered woman who chooses to kill her abuser while he sleeps is morally 
justified in doing so even though harm to her is not imminent, and that the law 
should give its legal imprimatur to this moral judgment.  I turn, therefore, to 
another feminist argument for expanding the defense of self-defense. 
V.  ABOLISHING THE IMMINENCY REQUIREMENT 
Although courts today generally permit evidence of BWS for various 
purposes, reformers have failed to convince many appellate courts to permit 
self-defense jury instructions in non-confrontational homicide cases.  That, to 
me, is good news.  As I have tried to demonstrate, the underlying argument of 
the battered woman who makes her case with BWS testimony is, really, that 
she should be excused for her actions because she failed to understand reality 
(namely, that her batterer cannot kill her while asleep), and not that the 
defense fits within the common law justification claim of self-defense. 
Many feminists are now more direct in their approach and, ultimately, 
make a far more plausible claim.  They argue that the imminency requirement 
in self-defense law should be abolished.  Conceptually, they argue, the 
purpose of the imminence requirement is to ensure that the self-defensive 
force was necessary.  But the law already requires proof that the use of deadly 
force was necessary; so the imminence requirement is superfluous.  Worse, 
the argument proceeds, the imminency rule is dangerous to women in the 
home.  This is not a case of two men in a bar or on the street; this is a woman, 
living with a violent, physically stronger partner, who must protect herself.  
To wait until an attack is imminent is to leave her defenseless.  She needs to 
act sooner.  Thus, the imminence requirement leaves the woman legally 
unprotected.  So, abolish the rule. 
Is abolishing the imminency rule a good idea?  First, it should be observed 
that the Model Penal Code, which some American states have adopted in this 
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 regard, does not require that the aggressor‘s attack be imminent.  It requires 
instead that use of deadly force by the innocent party be ―immediately 
necessary . . . on the present occasion.‖49  This is a significant and wise 
change.  For example, let‘s assume in the Norman situation that J.T drunkenly 
enters the kitchen where Judy is making dinner, and he says to her, ―Bitch, I 
am done with you, I am going upstairs to find my gun, come back, and kill 
you.‖  Traditional law, if it were strictly applied, would require Judy to wait 
until he returned with the firearm before she protects herself, a foolhardy 
scenario.  Under the Code, if Judy stabs J.T. in the back with a kitchen knife 
after he turns to go to the bedroom (presumably to obtain the weapon), she 
could reasonably argue that such force was ―immediately necessary on the 
present occasion.‖  J.T.‘s use of force was not yet imminent, but the necessity 
to repel his threat was immediate.  I advocate states implementing this Model 
Penal Code reform. 
The problem for Judy Norman is that this hypothetical case involved an 
immediately existing threat of deadly force, one very soon to be implemented.  
Judy Norman‘s real case involved non-confrontational self-defense.  As wise 
a change in the law as the Model Penal Code advocates, I don‘t think it would 
have helped Judy Norman in her real situation, as deadly force was not 
immediately necessary in the middle of the night while J.T. slept.  As far as 
we know, tomorrow was going to be no different than yesterday or the day 
after tomorrow.  This is why some feminists want all temporal limitations 
abolished.  They advocate so-called ―preemptive self-defense.‖ 
I oppose this.  First, one benefit of a strict temporal requirement is that it 
considerably reduces the risk of false positive killings—that is, when a person 
kills based on an incorrect belief that such force was necessary.  When an 
attack is underway, the risk of a false positive is virtually non-existent.  In the 
absence of any temporal limitation, however, false positives will increase 
dramatically.  As Professor Albert Alschuler has nicely put it in a different 
context, but which applies here as well, ―even funnel clouds sometimes turn 
around, and human beings sometimes defy predictions.  They turn around as 
well.‖50  Indeed, in view of meteorological advances, I would submit that the 
general path of funnel clouds is more predictable than the free-willed actions 
of human beings.  Lest we be too pessimistic, some abusers do turn their lives 
around.  Many of them are alcoholics; when they stop drinking, violence ends.  
Thus, what seems necessary now—killing the batterer—may turn out to be 
unnecessary.  Or, the abuser may find religion and turn his life around.  Or, 
the abuser might abandon his family and no longer represent a threat to the 
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 spouse.  Yes, he might represent a threat to someone else, but self-defense is 
just that—the right to use force to protect oneself, not to execute dangerous 
people.  One can list other possibilities, albeit far more remote: Maybe the 
abuser, if allowed to survive, will have a stroke and become an invalid or, for 
that matter, be hit by a truck and killed.  The point is just this: Once we 
dispense with a temporal requirement, we will find ourselves justifying the 
use of deadly force that would have proven unnecessary—but by killing the 
abuser today, we will never know if this was one of the false positive cases.  
And, if we abolish the temporal requirement, the newly expanded defense will 
presumably be available to all defendants, not just domestic violence victims.  
A self-defense rule with no temporal limitation, therefore, strikes me as quite 
troubling. 
Second, abolition of any temporal element could (and I fear would) too 
easily become a mere justification (by the abused woman and jurors) for 
revenge.  We would be inviting jurors to approve a homicide because the 
decedent, in their mind, deserved to die.  Indeed, when I teach Norman in my 
class or talk about it with others, this is what often comes out: Essentially, the 
―SOB doesn‘t deserve to live.‖  Consider how a judge in the Norman case put 
it: ―By his barbaric conduct over the course of twenty years, J.T. Norman 
reduced the quality of the defendant‘s life to such an abysmal state that, given 
the opportunity to do so, the jury might well have found that she was justified 
in acting in self-defense for the preservation of her tragic life.‖51  Translation: 
By his egregious conduct over many years, by making Judy Norman‘s life so 
dismal, a jury should be allowed to say, ―Good, he is dead.  Not guilty.‖  Or, 
consider another judge in another non-confrontational case, albeit involving a 
battering father: ―This case concerns itself with what happens . . . when a 
cruel, ill-tempered, insensitive man roams through his years of family life as a 
battering bully . . . .‖52  These statements—focusing, as they do, not on a 
single confrontational moment but on a life of depravity and brutality—
seemingly come down to the primitive point that the decedent deserved what 
was coming to him.  He had no moral right to life. 
This is the moral forfeiture theory of self-defense.
53
  As Hugo Bedeau has 
put the forfeiture theory, ―[the wrongdoer] no longer merits our consideration, 
any more than an insect or a stone does.‖54  I don‘t deny that some people, 
even many, buy into this  principle, but I prefer a society that does not treat 
humans as no better than noxious insects.  We shouldn‘t let this be the basis 
for self-defense law.  And, please notice, if we really accept the moral 
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 forfeiture doctrine, here is one effect: In Colorado, an abused woman once 
hired a contract killer to kill her husband; after the killing, she and he sought 
to justify the killing on the ground of self-defense (and defense-of-other).
55
  If 
the abuser forfeits his right to life, then it shouldn‘t matter who kills the 
noxious insect.  Abandonment of a temporal requirement invites us, sub 
silentio, to go down a very, very ugly road. 
Two other reasons exist for rejecting this proposal.  First, as Professor 
Kim Ferzan writes, ―[s]elf-defense is uniquely justified by the fact that the 
defender is responding to aggression.  Imminence, far from simply 
establishing necessity, is conceptually tied to self-defense by staking out the 
type of threats that constitute aggression.‖56  In the absence of imminence 
there is no aggression, and thus ―we blur the distinction between offense and 
defense.‖57  One need only consider the American invasion of Iraq to see that 
so-called ―preemptive self-defense‖ can easily result in a false positive (that 
Saddam possessed ―weapons of mass destruction‖ that would be used to 
attack the United States) and convert the defender into the aggressor. 
Finally, a significant temporal requirement of imminence is defensible on 
political theory grounds.  Generally speaking, the authority to use force in 
society is allocated to the state, rather than to the individual citizen.  As 
Whitley Kaufman has put it, ―[t]he basic idea is that the state claims a 
monopoly on force, under which no individual or non-state group is permitted 
to resort to force without the state‘s authorization.‖58  This requirement of 
authorization, which serves to control the use of violence in society, ―rests on 
the venerable natural law principle . . . that no one should be a judge in his 
own case; the decision to use force against another person must be made by an 
objective and disinterested authority.‖59  The exception to this rule is when 
―danger is present and immediate, and there is no time to resort to a central 
authority.‖60  Abolition of the temporal requirement threatens this principle.  
One should not accept an idea merely because it is old and has survived for 
centuries, but one should still respect tradition enough to place a heavy burden 
on those who claim that we have somehow become a society that no longer 
can live by these venerable rules. 
One last point: If we retain an imminency or immediately-necessary 
requirement, this does not mean that a battered woman like Judy Norman 
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 need be without criminal law protection if she kills in desperation when her 
abuser is not immediately threatening her.  I have written elsewhere
61
 that the 
answer is to apply a currently existing version of the duress defense to 
battered women who kill in nonconfrontational circumstances.  Specifically, 
the Model Penal Code definition of duress should apply.
62
  Essentially, the 
claim would be that, as a result of prior use of unlawful force by the abuser 
(no current threats are required under the Code), the battered woman was 
unable to resist killing her abuser, and that any other person of reasonable 
moral firmness (again, the language of the Code) would have been so 
inclined. 
This is an excuse claim, however, not a justification.  This defense does 
not assert that the killing was proper, but rather claims that, even though the 
killing is wrong, the battered woman is not culpable for her homicidal action.  
She is blameless not because she is crazy or suffers from some syndrome, but 
because she is all too normal, all too human, because anyone else in her 
situation might have acted as she did.  I want juries to have a chance to—and, 
on the proper facts, they will—exculpate the Judy Normans of the world, but 
it should be by way of excuse, rather than justification. 
Let‘s leave the justification defense of self-defense as it is or, even better, 
as it was.  Let‘s not start authorizing deadly force in more cases than the 
common law or Model Penal Code permit.  Feminist proposals and the 
proposals of others to expand the defense are, in my view, unwise. 
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